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COMMENTS
COMING OF AGE WITH TRIPS: A COMMENT ON J.H. REICHMAN, THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT COMES OF AGE: CONFLICT OR COOPERATION
WiTH THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss*
Commenting on an article by J.H. Reichman is much like
commenting on my own thoughts, for I agree so wholeheartedly with all
that he says. I too am concerned about the expiration of the transitional
phases set out in the TRIPS Agreement:? the close of the period given
developing countries to comply, 2 and the end of the moratorium on
nonviolation complaints. 3 For the fast-paced technological communities
that were largely responsible for promoting the adoption of rigorous
international intellectual property standards, five-or-so years probably
seemed like an eternity to wait for full compliance. In the evolution of law,
however, it is far from it. It is not enough time for an emerging nation to
absorb the world's knowledge base and develop a creative community -
that is, to acquire the assets needed to capture the benefits of strong
intellectual property rights and offset the costs of recognizing, examining,
monitoring, and enforcing them. Indeed, it is not enough time for any
society to come to terms with radically new policies, especially those that
are externally imposed. Accepting new ideas is a gradual process. It is
particularly difficult to imagine how any nation that is committed to
democratic government could, in only half a decade, persuade its electorate
to reallocate rights in such important matters as informational and cultural
property.
Most important, the moratorium set by the Uruguay Round is too
short a time for those charged with administering the Agreement and
adjudicating the disputes it engenders to formulate positions on what the
document states expressly, no less to decide what it might legitimately
imply. Fairly extravagant claims about what constitutes a nonviolation
complaint are being bandied about and, as Reichman notes, there is real
danger that this sort of confrontational rhetoric will backfire, spurring
* Pauline Newman Professor of Law, NYU School of Law.
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-RESULTS OFTHE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M.
81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
2 Id. art. 65. As Reichman notes, there are several grounds for extension of the
compliance period.
3 Id. art. 64.
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developing nations towards resistance (or even exit from the WTO) rather
than moving them to compliance. To give just one example, developing
nations did not accept the obligation to give preference to the enforcement
of intellectual property rights.4 Yet many of the demands being aired
would require these nations to reset their priorities in ways that give short
shrift to issues of more immediate local concern. As the events of 1999 in
Seattle suggest, such actions cannot help but engender anger, protest, and
ultimately opposition.5
I also agree with Reichman that forbearance from making
expansive demands is not sufficient, that the developed world must take a
proactive role in helping the citizens of developing countries to acquire a
stake - a genuine economic stake - in strong intellectual property
protection. His ideas are good ones. They range from finding ways to
reward the creative contributions of local knowledge, to taking seriously the
promises made in the TRIPS Agreement to provide technical assistance and
foster regional alliances and cooperation.6 But especially attractive are his
suggestions for promoting technology transfer, educating the local
population, and building infrastructure, as well as the proposals he and
David Lange call "public-private initiatives." Such initiatives are
transactions that align the interests of local business with that of foreign
rights holders under the auspices of government.
I would add two other concerns to Reichman's list of matters that
need to be addressed as the Agreement comes of age. One is a side-effect
of the pro-intellectual property climate in which the TRIPS Agreement was
negotiated. At the time of the Uruguay Round, intellectual property
production was coming into its own as a matter of public policy. For
example, the important roles that intellectual property rights now play in the
U.S. economy, in productivity and balance of payment figures, were then
beginning to be fully recognized.7 Concurrent with the negotiation of the
Agreement, the developed countries were, therefore, expanding both the
kinds and degrees of protection afforded; such efforts have, if anything,
accelerated post-TRIPS. 8 Accordingly, it is no surprise that much of the
4 Id. art. 41(5).
5 See Steven Greenhouse and Joseph Kahn, Talks and Turmoil: Workers' Rights; U.S.
Effort to Add Labor Standards to Agenda Fails, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1999, at Al (noting that
one issue of contention is patent rights); A Turbulent Trade Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,
1999, at 10 (attributing part of the turmoil to concerns over the cost of patented
pharmaceuticals in the developing world).
6 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at arts. 67, 69.
7 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Diane L. Zimmerman, The Culture and Economics
of Participation in an International Intellectual Property Regime, 29 J. INT'L L. & PoL 1, 2
(1997).
8 Examples in trademark law include the enactment of antidilution and cybersquatting
laws in the United States. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) & (d) (2000); in copyright and data base
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discussion surrounding the Agreement has been based on the assumption
that there will always be a consensus among dominant players that as a
normative matter, more protection is better; that changes will always come
in the direction of augmenting intellectual property rights. Thus, one trope,
found especially in the academic literature, is focused on identifying the
dangers that high protection poses to innovation (Reichman's paper is a
good example). Another theme is the discussion among low-protectionists
on ways to limit the extent to which such changes - particularly in the
Berne and Paris Conventions, 9 which are referenced by the TRIPS
Agreement - should be automatically incorporated into the obligations that
the TRIPS Agreement imposes.'0
What has not been sufficiently explored is the opposite scenario:
the possibility that the populace (or even the creative sector) will actually
listen to the likes of Reichman and rediscover the value of a robust public
domain. History, along with some current events, suggest that such a turn-
around is not as unlikely as might be supposed. Many industrialized
nations have experienced times when the high cost of intellectual property
rights regimes was viewed as an obstacle to innovation or otherwise
inimical to competition and expressive policies. In Europe, for instance, a
time of hostility in the mid-19th century actually led to the abolition of
patents in the Netherlands and Switzerland." The United States passed
through such a period as recently as the 1960s.12 Some of the same
sentiment is being expressed right now: first, with respect to the connection
between patent rights on pharmaceuticals and the high price of health care;
protection in Europe, Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases (OJ L 077, 27/03/1996 p.0020-0028); in
patent law, protection for business methods in the United States, State Street Bank & Trust
Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct.
851 (1999); in U.S. contract law, see the Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act
(UCITA), available at http:/www.law.upenn.edullibrary/ulc/ucitalcitalOst.htm (last visited
Sept. 17, 2001); ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (71h Cir. 1996). For other international
developments, see, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at the World
Intellectual Property Organization, 37 VA. J. INT'LL. 369 (1997).
9 The Berne Convention for Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 9 September
1886; Paris text, July 24, 1971; The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property of 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923, see, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 1, arts. 1, 2, 9.
10 See, e.g., Neil Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on
TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT'LL. 441,451 (1997)
U See, e.g., Martin J. Adelman, et al, PATENT LAW 22 (1998).
12 See, e.g., Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel, 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (limiting enforcement
of state unfair competition law); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234
(1964) (same); Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) (encouraging invalidation of patents);
Brulotte v. Thys, 379 U.S. 29 (1964) (limiting the reach of patent holders).
2001]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
and more recently, in regard to meeting demand for patented products, like
CIPRO, to treat anthrax or other biological warfare threats. 3
Given this history, it behooves low-protectionists to heed the
warning Reichman has just delivered to the high-protectionists about the
ultimate effects of their rhetoric. True, the low-protectionists could be
right: it could very well be bad if the TRIPS Agreement is read as a one-
way ratchet, forcing increased protection on every WTO member whenever
any coalition of members thinks more protection will suit its own needs, but
preventing any country from ever lowering protective standards. But the
idea of divorcing contemporary understandings of intellectual property
norms from the way the Agreement is interpreted could easily backfire, for
it would also prevent the Agreement from rapidly incorporating renewed
appreciation for public knowledge. What is required, therefore, is further
elucidation of the incorporation argument, as well as more thinking about
the responsibilities and powers of the Council on TRIPS 14 to oversee the
way that the Agreement is applied. Further, although one of the triumphs
of the Agreement is said to be the shift from diplomatic dispute settlement
to an adjudicatory approach, I5 the precedential effect of panel and Appellate
Body decisions needs substantial thinking. Legalistic rules of issue
preclusion (collateral estoppel) and stare decisis may not be fully
appropriate, not just during the transition period, but for a long time
afterwards. 6 Since a certain degree of tension between changing domestic
needs (or even normative convictions) and harmonized international
obligations is all but inevitable, it is important to find ways to bring
flexibility into the administration of the TRIPS Agreement.
13 See, e.g., Amy Harmon, In the "Idea Wars, " A Fight to Control a New Currency, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, § 3, at 1 (describing the confluence of forces shaping U.S. policy in
the Doha Round of WTO negotiations); David E. Rosenbaum, The Gathering Storm Over
Prescription Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1999, at 1 (describing the political pressure to
control the price of patented drugs); John M. Broder, Gore's Latest Attack on Bradley Tells
Only Part of Story, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2000, at A22 (noting that Gore is making Bradley's
support of pharmaceutical companies part of the campaign for the Democratic Party's
presidential nomination). Indeed, patent rights have sometimes been limited to decrease
such costs. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000) (permitting generic drug manufacturers to
conduct FDA-mandated tests patented drugs during the patent period); 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1)
(2000) (limiting remedies for infringing medical activities carried out by medical
practitioners and health care entities).
14 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 68.
15 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art.
3.8, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND, vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. See also Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss and Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting
TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'LL. 275, 276 (1997).
16 Id. at 291-96.
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My other concern is that if high protectionists are not satisfied with
what they achieve through the Agreement, they will end run it. They could
do it in at least two ways. First, they could argue for extraterritorial
application of the high protectionist regimes of the industrialized countries.
Extraterritorial application of antitrust law is well known, and there are now
a smattering of intellectual property cases developing theories of domestic
harm derived from foreign distributions.17 As the machinery for the
dissemination of intellectual products improves - I am thinking here of the
internet - these arguments become increasingly plausible. Their acceptance
could, however, be as detrimental to the emergence of innovative
communities in the developing world as the possibilities envisioned by
Reichman. It is, after all, not very likely that a court in one country will
interpret its own law in ways that take the interests of another jurisdiction
into account, and this will be true no matter how limited the other
jurisdiction's obligations are under the TRIPS Agreement.
The second end-run risk comes from the possibility that courts will
begin to entertain intellectual property cases based on foreign causes of
action and to decide them in an uncritical way. Again, it is easy to see how
this could happen. As worldwide demand for intellectual products increases
and the distribution of works becomes easier, intellectual property holders
more often obtain worldwide rights in their creative products.! Because of
the territoriality of intellectual property law, worldwide infringements are
traditionally litigated country by country. But that is expensive and it can
yield inconsistent judgments. In trademark law in particular, such
judgments could spell chaos: what, for instance, if a court in Xandia gives
Trademark Owner A the exclusive right to use a particular mark and a court
in Patria gives the exclusive right to Trademark Owner B? Not only will A
and B interfere with one another's marketing plans (especially on the
internet), but the goal of trademark law, the prevention of consumer
confusion, will be undermined.19 Thus, there is sure to be strong and
increasing pressure to consolidate disputes on worldwide rights in a single
forum.20 Since the weakest link in the TRIPS Agreement is the absence of
17 See, e.g., Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters, 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1997); Fun-
Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Industries, 111 F.3d 993 (2d Cir. 1997); Stewart v. Adidas,
1997 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH), 1 27, 646 (S.D.N.Y., Apr 30, 1997).
18 Helping this along are measures like the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the Madrid
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S.
389, which ease the burden in acquiring rights in many countries.
19 For an example of a case giving rise to this sort of possibility, see Mecklermedia
Corporation v. D.C. Congress Gesellschaft, (1997) F.S.R. 627 (High Court of Justice,
Chancery Division), available at http://www.pagehargrave.co.uk/InternetCases.htm.
20 For an attempt that failed, see Stewart v. Adidas, supra note 12 (refusing to dismiss
the U.S. action on forum non conveniens grounds).
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adequate enforcement mechanisms in developing countries,21 it is most
likely that the court chosen to entertain such a dispute will be a developed
country, while some of the countries in which infringement took place will
be less developed countries (let us assume Xandia is the developed country
entertaining the dispute and Patria is the developing country where the
infringement took place).22
In theory of course, choice of law rules will require the Xandian
court to apply to each part of the dispute the appropriate country's
intellectual property law. However, because of the traditional territoriality
of intellectual property rights, choice of law rules in this area are rather
undeveloped. As rights are asserted across a multiplicity of jurisdiction, it
may well be that applying territorial law will not result in a judgment that
protects anyone's interests (as noted, trademark cases are likely to create
this possibility). In such situations, courts may look for a best law, one that
may or may not give sufficient deference to the policies underlying the
TRIPS Agreement or the protections the Agreement offers to developing
countries.
Even where it is possible to apply each country's own law, a great
deal of care will need to be taken to apply it accurately. If, say, Patria law
applies, but Patria enacted intellectual property law only when it joined the
WTO, its law may not have been construed often enough for the Xandian
court to understand how it is intended to work. Indeed, if Patria is an
emerging nation with a nascent technological community as well as deep
poverty (India may be an example), enhancing protection would have both
strong positive and negative effects; it is doubtful that a court outside Patria
would have the ability to even know what policy Patria would be trying to
further in interpreting its law. Most important, and this is the core of my
concern, it may be very tempting for the Xandian court to understand the
TRIPS Agreement as having harmonized the law of Xandia and Patria,
leading the court to apply Xandian precedents as if they represented the law
of Patria.
Admittedly, under current legal principles, Patria could respond to
a decision on Patrian law that it regarded as wrong by refusing to enforce
the judgment. If, however, the proposed Hague Convention on
21 If the lack of adjudicatory capacity comes from resource limitations, such countries
may not be in violation of their TRIPS obligations by reason of art. 41(5). See TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 1.
22 In some ways, this possibility should be welcome by those sharing Reichman's
concerns. If Xandia could render an enforceable judgment concerning an infringement in
Patria by a defendant with assets outside Patria, then the absence of an efficient adjudicatory
mechanism in Patria would no longer matter. Not only could the intellectual property holder
be made whole, but pressure on Patria to divert public resources from matters of greater
domestic concern into intellectual property protection would abate.
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Enforcement of Judgments23 is adopted by Xandia and Patria, and if the
Convention includes foreign intellectual property disputes within the
subject matter that courts can adjudicate with an expectation of
enforcement, then Patria's options will be more limited.24 In addition, if the
defendant has assets outside Patria and that country is willing to enforce the
Xandian judgment, Patria's own views will again be irrelevant: the
judgment will be enforced even if the Patrian activity at issue was judged
on the inapposite policies of Xandia.
All this goes to say that the points Reichman makes are extremely
important. I hope his admonitions concerning the backlash that strong
protection could provoke are taken seriously by those who find themselves
litigating interjurisdictional cases or in a position to argue for
extraterritorial application of strong intellectual property law. His and
Lange's attempts to persuade intellectual property holders to support
infrastructure development and training are especially crucial. There is
little in the current version of the TRIPS Agreement that protects
developing nations from the way that foreign courts interpret their laws.
Indeed and as noted, the very existence of the Agreement, coupled with its
repeated description as an instrument of harmonization, may well seduce
courts into thinking that they need not spend a great deal of time looking for
differences between the law they already know and the law they are being
asked to apply. Thus, it is critical that every member of the WTO quickly
come to the point where it will enjoy some benefits from the application of
strong intellectual property protection to activities occurring within its
borders.
23 The current draft of this proposal is available at
http://www.hcch.net/efconventions/draft36e.html (last visited September 17, 2001). See also
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss and Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and
Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, available at
http:llwww.kentlaw.edu/deptslipp/intl-courts/ (suggesting a revision of the Hague Draft to
deal with the special challenges posed by intellectual property litigation).
24 The current draft of the Convention takes the opposite tack for patents and trademarks:
it makes the jurisdiction whose rights are in issue the exclusive forum for dispute resolution.
See id. However, for the reasons given in note 22 and accompanying text, such a position
may not be stable.
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